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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appella~t, 
vs. 
STYLE CRETE, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CITATION OF NEWLY DECIDED 
CASE IN SUPPORT OF POSITION 
OF RESPONDENT IN POINT I OF 
STYLE CRETE, INC., BRIEF 
case No. 
10902 
The Respondent, Style Crete Inc., pur-
suant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. submits in 
connection with the Court's consideration 
of the appealable issue of ":r:eplacement land" 
raised by the State and discussed in Point I 
of Respondent's Brief, a newly decided case, 
State Road Commission v. Rowland s. Bingham, 
1 
et al, No. 10831, issued and filed by this : 
Court under the opinion of Mr. Justice Callister[ 
on January 23, 1968. 
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"pincer" effect of the two public projects, inadequate drain-
age, physical and functional disutility of the building, slic-
ing of the property into three separate parcels, proximity of 
the railroad and higfovay to the building ( 11 feet from the 
office area) and substantial impairment of access, air, view 
and site prominence. None of these damaged factors could 
in any way have been mitigated or cured by the acquiring 
of other "available ground". Indeed, Style-Crete could have 
purchased the neighboring Arnold Machinery land and each 
and every other piece of industrial land in Salt Lake County 
for that matter, and it could not have cured in the slightest, 
these elements of damage which were occasioned by the 
location. proximity and design of the State acquisitions. 
The severance damage which evolved herein was of a 
cate.'.,'.·ory seen in Southern Pacific v. Arthur and State 
Road Comm. v. Ward and accordingly, the general rule of 
the "before and after" was the legal measurement. Had 
Style-Crete claimed that severance damage was caused by 
the removal and loss of the condemned 1.99 acreage and 
the consequent contraction of the remaining property, the 
State's proffer could have some merit since other available 
property \Vould replace the land condemned and thus cure 
the .severance damage. But that hypothesis is not of this 
case and it would have been flagrant and prejudicial error 
if the trial court had not rejected the irrtelevant offer of 
proof of the State. 
POINT II. 
CASES CITED BY THE STATE ARE UN-
AUTHORITATIVE AND DO NOT SUPPORT 
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ITS CONTENTION THAT ITS PROFFER OF 
AVAILABLE LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The State's reservoir of case authority, on the admis-
sibility of its proffer of available land to replace that con-
demned, is limited to five decisions. Two of those decisions 
are from intermediate courts and only one could be charac-
terized as a recent view ( 1943, with the others being de-
cided in 1847, 1886, 1900 and 1917). While they support 
the position of Style-Crete herein rather than that of the 
State, they deserve only limited alttention in light of devel-
opment of the Utah decisions. 
In Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Shaubacher, 57 Mo. 582 
(1847)., St. Loui1:; v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., 196 S. W. 
107 (Mo. 1917), and St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg. 
Co., 168 S. W. 2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943), the cost of pur-
chasing other land was found to fully cure the severance 
damage by restoring the economic unit and placing the 
owner in the same position as before. The rational ex-
pressed in St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., supra, is 
representative: 
"But in a case where the taking of a part of a 
tract which is devoted to a special use results in 
large depreciation in value for that special use, the 
measure of that depreciation ought to be the sum 
required to be expended in order to rehabilitate the 
property for such use or replace the plant in statu 
quo ante capiendum; provided, of course, that re-
habilitation in such manner be practicable. * * * 
In cases where no available property is owned by 
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him whose land is taken, the price at which other 
lands adjacent equally as valuable intrinsically, as 
convenient, as economical in use, and as accessible, 
and which can be bought, may be shown as measur-
ing the amount of depreciation to which the lands 
damaged but nort physically taken, have been sub-
jected" P. 112 of 197 S. W. 
The Missouri cases are irrelevant in this Appeal, since 
the purchase of neighboring land would not return Style-
Crete to the status quo before condemnation. Nor is the 
case of Illinois and St. L. R. Co. v. Switzer, et al., 117 Ill. 
399 N. E. 664 ( 1886) germane since the owner there claimed 
the loss of water to a mill site. The acquisition of water 
from other sources would have cured the damage. And 
lastly, in Gulf C. & S. F. R. v. Brugger, 59 S. W. 56 (Tex. 
Civ. moo), the condemnee urged that the balance of his 
economic unit of timber land had been damaged because of 
the removal or loss of the condemned property. The Texas 
Court held that the economic balance could be restored 
through the substitution of equal replacement property. The 
Brugger case is of no significance in the disposition of this 
appeal. 
Thus it is that the State has not sited a single decision, 
treatise, or authority which would factually support the 
resutt of which it asks in this appeal. The insecurirty of 
that position is matched by the rather celebrated fact that 
this appeal is the first time since the commencement of In-
terstate Highway acquisitions in 1956, where the State of 
Utah has sought to apply the replacement rule in a non-
agricultural taking and under facts such as the case at bar. 
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POINT III. 
THE STATE'S THEORY ON REPLACEMENT 
RULE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE, AS SET 
OUT IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 15, IS IMPOSSIBLE OF PRACTICAL 
APPLICATION. 
As previously pointed out, the "replacement rule" has 
no application to the facts of this case where the State con-
demns two trips of land in opposite directions through the 
middle of an industrial operation. It was not entitled to 
an instruction on "replacement land". However, the lack 
of understanding which permeated the State's approach to 
severance damage herein, is demonstrated by its Request 
No. 15 submitted to the trial Court. In part, it provided 
that with respect to determination of severance damage: 
"In order for the defendant to recover such 
severance damages it has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that as of Decem-
ber 28, 1965, the date of service of the summons, no 
comparable land was available to it in the area 
which could be substituted for the land taken or 
severed. If such comparable land was available to 
the defendant, proximity and severance damages 
shouid total an amount representing the difference 
between (1) the value of the remainder before the 
taking and (2) the value of the remainder plus the 
comparable land after the taking, less the cost of 
the comparable land." 
This requested charge is not only inconsistent ·with the 
"replacement rule" under the Carlson and Co-op Security 
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decisions (even assuming arguendo, that such rule were 
applicable), but it is inconsistent inter se. To begin with, 
the Request seeks to amalgamate the repla:::ement doctrine 
within the "before and after rule" by providing that sever-
ance damage shall be the difference between the before and 
after values, less the cost of the "comparable land". Such 
flies in the face of the very theory of the rule which the 
State advocates is pertinent. State Road Comm. v. Co-op 
Security holds that if the replacement rule is applicable, 
severance damage in the traditional sense cannot be recov-
ered: 
"Where there is other comparable land avail-
able to the condemnee that would accomplish the 
same use to which the land taken had been put ---, 
swic1rincc damages are not available to one refus-
ing to accept such land;" (Emphasis added) P. 180 
of 1U.2d. 
Further, the Utah cases provide that if the replace-
ment doctrine is relevant, the cost of acquiring the substi-
tute land is the measure of severance damage. Request No. 
15 of Plaintiff, in directing that the cost of purchase shall 
be deducted from the before and after values of the re-
mainder, charges the property owner with the ex-
pense of acquiring the same. In other words, the owner, 
when faced with a partial-taking of his ground, should pay 
from his own pocket without reimbursement, the purchase 
price necessary to obtain replacement land. Nearly 2 acres 
of Style-Crete land was condemned but the State contends 
that the 10 acres of replacement land should be purchased 
by Style-Crete. If the 1.99 acre were reasonably worth 
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$5,000.00 and the cost of the ten acres had been $30,000.00, 
Instruction No. 15 would require that the $30,000.00 be de-
ducted from the severance damage award. Not even the 
wildest stretch of the replacement rule under Carlson and 
Co-op Security would permit such a grotesque result. It 
offends not only the time honored rules of just compensa-
tion, but due process of law as well. It is not surprising 
that Appellant fails to cite one case in support of Request 
No.15. 
Requested Instruction 15 would further advise the jury 
that the replacement land should be "substituted for the 
land taken or severed". Such is inconsistent with the re· 
mainder of the instruction with respect to the assessment 
of the value of the remaining property, before and after 
condemnation, since the before and after values, under the 
State's theory of replacement, would be one and the same. 
Request No. 15, which is the net result of the State's 
Appeal, is incongruous, ambiguous and almost incomprehen-
sible. It is impossible of practical application, much the 
less consistent in theory. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CONCEPT OF SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS ERRON-
EOUSLY CONCEIVED. 
The synthesis of Plaintiff's argument on severance 
damages is set out in pages 23 and 39, paragraph 1, of its 
Brief. It is urged therein that with respect to severance 
damage, "the owner is entitled only to an amount repre-
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senting the damage actually done to the land * * * 
and suffered." And that there is "a subsitantial distinction 
between compensation for land taken and damages to prop-
erty not taken". Conceivably, Plaintiff contends that there 
must be a physical invasion or eroding-away of the remain-
ing property, and that severance damage is of an inferior 
rank to compensation payable for land taken. 
Such argument, while popular some 200 years ago, has 
long gone by the board, particularly under the Constitution, 
Statutes, and case decisions in Utah. Art. I Sec. 22 in pro-
viding that "private property shall not be taken or damaged 
without just compensation'', makes no distinction between 
the quality of recovery for severance damage, vis-a-vis, a 
taking. Neither is 78-34-10, U. C. A. 1953 discriminatory 
in favor of a taking and against severance damage. And 
this Court in a host of decisions, has used the same test for 
severance damage as it has for a taking, i.e., market value. 
State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 
(1963): Southern Pacific v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 
693 (1960); State Road Comm. v. Co-op Security Corp., 
supra; San Pedro A. L. & S. L. R. Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Boa.rd of Education, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263 (1909). 
While there may be a contest as to whether a paticu-
lar element of severance damage is compensable, once the 
issue is resolved in favor of compensability, the standard 
of compensation is market value. Weber Basin Conserv. 
Dist., v. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960). 
The State claims that an owner must mitigate his dam-
age in eminent domain. But the replacement theory which 
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the State urges herein would not miitigate Style-Crete's 
severance damages. It does not, because those damages 
could not be cured or mitigated, as a matter of law, by the 
purchase of neighboring land. Adherence to the State's 
theory \Vould only amplify that damage by requiring the 
landowner to purchase ten acres of other property at a cost 
of $30,000.00, which cost Style-Crete would bear. The 
State's entire approach to the severance damage issue is 
groundless. 
POINT V. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY AND FULLY CHARGED THE 
JURY ON THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
Under Point III of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that 
the trial Court erred prejudicially in its charge to the jury 
under Instructions 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20 and 21. The State 
fails to set out the entire instruction in any instance but 
attempts to rely on error relating to capitalization, punctu-
ation and phrases which counsel has severed from the con-
text. No claim of error runs to any genuine issue of sub-
stantive law and in no instance did the State request a dif-
ference charge, other than Instruction No. 15. Further-
more, while the State devotes considerable time to argu-
ment on Nos. 4, 12 and 20, it took no exception to either of 
those instructions at trial, (R. 937-938), so it is forecloseJ 
of opportunity to make an initial complaint in this Court. 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 U. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954). 
Instruction No. 4 (R. 19) : Although no exception was 
taken to No. 4, the State's objection is typical of its failure 
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to recognize in this case the constitutional mandate and 
statutory method for assessment of damages in eminent do-
main. The instruction, (used time and again in the Dis-
tricts of Utah, including Federal actions) charges the jury 
on the fundamental ordinances upon which this case rests, 
the Constitution. The objections of the State, i.e., that No. 
4 is better reserved for a "civic's class since it directs the 
jury's attention away from the issues being tried," disputes 
the law itself as enunciated by this Court in State Road 
Comm. v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957): 
"Just compensation means that the owners 
must be put in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had their property not 
b~en taken." 
The Sbte's theory runs aground the same view ex-
pressed by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. 
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1942). 
Instruction No. 8 (R. 23) : The State claims that this In-
struction is a commentary of the Court upon the weight 
and effect of the evidence. In no sense is it that. The pur-
pose of the Instruction was twofold; one, it defined clearly 
the factors under the evidence that could be taken into con-
sideration in determining severance damage, and two, it 
presented, without comment, the theory of the landowner 
on severance damage. Both functions are properly the ex-
ercise of the trial Court in Utah. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 
Utah 262, 139 P. 2d 216 (1943); Morrison v. Perry, 104 
Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772 (1943); Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 
U. 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 309 (1955). Charge No. 8 did not sug-
gest, expressly or impliedly, the feelings, of the trial judge, 
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as Instruction No. 1, had already told the jury that the 
court "neither forms, has or expresses any opinion or judg-
ment" as to ithe issues of fact. Nor did the Instruction di-
rect the jury to consider the factors of severance damage, 
the phrase, "you may take into account" having been used. 
This Court has held that each party to a law suit is entitled 
to have his theory submitted to the jury by an appropriate 
instruction if there is evidence to support it. Webb v. 
Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114 (1942). 
Instruction No. 10 (R. 25) : Charges that the value of the 
remaining property of Style-Crete after the condemnation 
acquisition, should be considered as one propel'ty although 
in three separate parts. Plaintiff claims that it cannot find 
"any support in the cases for the proposition". If State of 
Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956) is not 
sufficient support, State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 
P. 2d 630 (1953), State Road Comm. v. Noble, 8 U. 2d 405, 
335 P. 2d 831 (1959) and State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 
U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963) should be. They all state 
that the property is to be evaluated in its then existent con-
dition with the test being what one buyer would pay to one 
seller, and not what three or more buyers may pay to one 
seller. The test is as applicable to the after value as it is to 
the before value and the decisions have never carved out a 
distinction between the two in the approach to value. The 
State's plea that Instruction No. 10 could result in an owner 
realizing a "profit" on the sale of the remaining property 
is unworthy of comment. The Instruotion properly states 
the law of the case. 
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lnstmction No. 11 (R. 2G), defines a comparable sale, in 
the legal sense, un<ler the decisions of this Court in State 
v. Peek, s11,pm, Southern Pacific v. Arthur, supra, Weber 
Basfo Consnv. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 
( 1950) and State Road Comrn. v. Peterson, supra. It is an 
instruction originally drafted by the Office of the Attorney 
General in 1959, it has been used by the Road Commission 
and landowners alike in the bulk of condemnation litigation 
in the last eight years, and it is now considered a stock in-
struction by most trial judges in this State. It does not at 
all charge the jury to weigh any particular sale or one sale 
against another. Instead, it defines the rudiments of a com-
parable transaction of which the trial Court has the respon-
sibility. It is of no difference than charging the jury on the 
elements of the "reasonable prudent man" in a negligence 
suit. 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 27) : The single exception of the 
State is to the use of the words "fairly and reasonably" 
in the Instruction. There is no merit to the objection. Hav-
ing- taken no exception at all to the Instruction in the trial 
Court, the State may not be heard on the objection for the 
first time on appeal. Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P. 
2d 969 (1937). 
Instruction No. 19 (R. 34), of which the State "laments", 
is of stock variety and has been used over again in 
eminent domain trials in this State. It charges that 
an owner may not stand 'in the way of a Government 
improvement by refusing to sell his property. That is a 
correct statement of the law. Barnes V. Wade, 90 Utah 1, 
58 P. 2d 297 (1936). The statement that the owner is to 
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be paid "justly and fairly" for the condemned property 
needs no citation. The best that State's counsel can do with 
this charge is to say that it was "inflammatory, loaded" 
and contained unnecessary capitalization of words. The 
objection is against this Court's definition of just compen-
sation and is unworthy of belief. Significantly, Plaintiff 
does not refer the Court to a case in point that would jus-
tify a finding of prejudicial error. 
Instruction No. 21 (R. 36) : This Instruction advised the 
jury that its verdict may be within the range of the testi-
mony submitted by the parties as the weight of the evidence 
fairly reflects. State counsel argues that while the charge 
"is not particularly harmful", this Court should neverthe-
less reverse and declare that in an eminent domain case, a 
verdict may exceed or be less than the testimony of the 
parties on land value and damages, all dependent upon the 
whims of the jury. Such contention ignores the rule of this 
Court announced in fVeber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Moore, 
2 U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954), Weber Basin Conserv. 
Dist. v. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) and Porcu-
pine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp., 15 U. 2d 318, 392 P. 2d 
620 (1964). In Skeen, the Court remitted a jury verdict on 
severance damages which exceeded the expert testimony of 
the landowner. Under the theory of State's counsel herein, 
the Skeen case was decided improperly by this Court. In-
struction No. 21 accurately presents the rule of the case. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING THE WRITTEN APPRAISAL RE-
PORT OF THE STATE'S VALUE WITNESS, 
SOLOMON. 
The claim of the State in Point IV of its Brief, page 
37, that the trial Court erroneously excluded an offer of the 
written appraisal report of the State value witness, Mr. 
Solomon, is ludicrous. It is elementary trial practice in this 
jurisdiction that a written report of an appraisal witness 
is not evidence of the facts in issue and while the report 
may be referred to by the witness to refresh his mtemlory, 
it may not be admitted in evidence. Such is the general evi-
dentiary rule, U. S. v. Rapzyy, 157 F. 2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946); 
5 Nichols on Eminent Dornain, 129 Sec. 18.1 (1). The State 
suggests that because counsel for Style-Crete on cross ex-
amination, requested to see the notes of the State appraiser 
and thereafter proceeded with cross examination as to the 
witness' opinion given on direct, that the door is thus op-
ened for the admissibility of an entire written appraisal re-
port on redirect examination. If that were the rule, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to conduct a cross ex-
amination of an appraiser without having his written re-
port (prepared outside of the courtroom and containing all 
sorts of inadmissible statements and conclusions) received 
in evidence on redirect. 
State's counsel on redirect examination of Mr. Solo-
mon, offered his entire appraisal report as Exhibit P-33, 
although cross examination had only touched upon a frac-
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tion of its contents. The objection was made that the report 
was not the best evidence of the witness' opinion, that the 
proffer constituted an emphasis of a particular part of the 
witness' testimony, that the State had already submitted a 
large written sheet showing the computations and value 
conclusions of the witness and that Defendant's counsel had 
not, by requesting to see the notes of the witness on cross 
examination, placed in issue the evidential significance of 
the notes (R. 845-846). The objection was properly sus-
tained by the trial judge. 
POINT VII. 
THE POSITION OF THE STATE ON APPEAL 
AND AT TRIAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS 
OWN TESTIMONY BY WHICH IT IS BOUND. 
The State has not challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict. The verdict and judgment 
are substantially supported by the predominate weight of 
the evidence. In fact, much of the State's testimony cor-
roborated that of Style-Crete. 
Part of the State's difficulty at trial lay in its misin-
terpretation of Style-Crete's proof of damages. With re-
spect to the vibration testimony, for example, Style-Crete 
introduced evidence as to the probable effects upon the 
building from the vibration of high speed trains. The pur-
pose of that evidence was not to show the existence of 
actual vibration in connection with a business loss, but to 
show an important condition probably resulting from con-
demnation which would affect the thinking of the buyer and 
seller as to the market value of the remammg property. 
Yet from the approach of the State to Style-Crete's vibra-
tion testimony and, indeed from the Commission's own evi-
dence, it is apparent that the State thought it was trying a 
dam,1ge vibration case against a railroad and that the tria-
ble issue was whether there was, in fact, actual and sus-
tained vibration damage. The State's approach overlooked 
the fact that market value and not vibration was the ulti-
mate and triable issue. 
Further, Mr. Solomon, the State's only value witness, 
stated unequivocally that the remaining property and build-
ing would be depreciated in value due to the (a) location of 
the nine foot railroad and highway fill in front and along 
side of the building, (b) the trapping of normal run off 
water by the fill, ( c) taking of the septic tank drainage 
field, (d) loss of parking space, (e) loss of visibility, (f) 
impairment of access and (g) loss of special features of the 
plant itself (R. 726-729). He further testified that in his 
opinion, the vibration from the railroad would likely have a 
detrimental effect on the value of the remaining property so 
that it could no longer be used for cast stone or close toler-
ance manufacturing. The State thereafter, attempted to im-
peach Mr. Solomon's testimony through the use of two 
other witnesses, Messrs. Pickett and Wilde. Pickett had 
experience only in massive concrete structures such as 
bridges, and none in cast stone (R. 863-864). Wilde ad-
mitted that after cast stone once has set up, vibration there-
after would weaken the product (R. 855). 
In closing argument to the jury, counsel for the State 
argued in substance that: 
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"Mr. Solomon did a conscientious job and he 
tried to be very fair to the defendant, but in view 
of the fact that he based his opinion of after value 
on some assumptions as to vibrations which are not 
correct, even his appraisal of the value of the prop-
erty after the taking was too low. I believe you 
would be justified in disregarding his erroneous 
assumptions which were favorable to the defendant 
and find that the value of the property after the 
taking was considerably greater than what he con-
sidered it to be, and that the damages suffered by 
the defendant were substantially less than the fig-
ure stated in the opinion given by Mr. Solomon." 
(R. 920-923). 6 
It seems rather ironic that the State would call as its 
only expert on value, a witness who followed the State's in-
structions to appraise the property under the "before and 
after rule" only to have State's counsel impeach and dis-
credit his testimony on closing argument. Certainly it is 
inconsistent with what this Court said in Weber Basin Con-
serv. Dist. v. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) : 
"A party cannot call a witness to testify and 
then select only that testimony favorable to his 
cause, ignoring that which is unfavorable." 
The verdict and judgment stand fully supported by 
the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
While the facts in this case presented serious issues of 
substantial dispute, the questions of law were relatively un-
8At the hearing on the State's motion for new trial, the undisputed 
affidavit set forth above was stricken, but the affidavit should be con-
sidered in weighing the merits of the State's Appeal herein. 
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complicated for an eminent domain suit, until ithe State 
raised the replcement land theory of severance ·damage. 
There is no room for that theory under the facts of this 
case and to hold otherwise, would be to upset the precedent 
developed in this jurisdiction of the last thirty years or 
more. The ruling of the trial Court rejecting the replace-
ment theory of severance damage should be upheld by this 
Court. The general rule of the before and after is the only 
principle which fits the facts of this case. 
The objections of the State to the trial Court's charge 
to the jury are unwarranted and contrary to the decisions 
of this Court. The trial Court gave all of the State's Re--
quests for instructions except No. 15 on the irrelevant 
theory of "replacement land". 
A just and fair verdict was returned after eight days 
of trial fully supported by the evidence. The judgment of 
just compensation entered on the verdict should be af-
firmed and the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, 
500 Kennecott Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 












EXHIBIT NO. D I 
CA$E NO. 162592 
PROPERTY OF STYLE-CRETE INC. 
I. CJ PROPERTY AS OF CONDEMNATION DATE ....... 14.283 AC. 
2. OVERLAY I- RAILROAD "TAKING" 
HIGHWAY "TAKING" ................ 1.999 AC. 
3.0VERLAY 2- PLANT EXPANSION 
4. REMAINING PROPERTY OF STYLE CRETE ......... 12.184 AC. 
so. WEST OF "TAKING" "A II. .0.110 AC. 
NO. WEST OF "TAKING" "&" ........ S.472 AC. 


























EXHIBIT NO. D I 
CASE NO. 162592 
PROPERTY OF STYLE-CRETE INC. 
I. c:J PROPERTY AS OF CONDEMNATION DATE. . . . . . 14.263 AC. 
2.0VERLAY I- RAILROAD "TAKING" 
HIGHWAY "TAKING". 
3.0VERLAY 2- PLANT EXPANSION 
4. REMAINING PROPERTY OF STYLE CRETE 
SO. WEST OF "TAKING" "A" 
NO. WEST OF "TAKING" "B" .. 
. ... 1.999 AC. 
...... 12.264 AC. 
0,530 AC. 
. .. 3.472 AC. 
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2. OVERLAY I- RAILROAD "TAKING" 
HIGHWAY "TAKING" 
3.0VERLAY 2 - PLANT EXPANSION 
4. REMAINING PROPERTY OF STYLE CRETE 
SO. WEST OF "TAKING" "A" 
NO. WEST OF "TAKING" "8". 
EAST OF"TAKING" "C'.' 
14.263 AC. 
.. 1.999 AC. 
12.264 AC . 
0.530 AC. 
. . 3.472 AC . 
8.262 AC. 
N 
